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COMMENTS
OBSTACLES TO HOLDING A PAROLE OFFICIAL IN
VIRGINIA LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENT RELEASE OR
SUPERVISION OF A PAROLEE
I. INTRODUCTION
With the continuing problem of overcrowded prisons, parole
board officials have been under increasing pressure to release pris-
oners before the natural termination of their sentences. As a conse-
quence, the public suffers the risk that the parolee, once released,
will commit a violent crime. If this should occur, the question then
becomes whether the injured individual can, as a result, hold the
parole board civilly liable for the negligent release or supervision of
the parolee.'
The issues involving official immunity of parole board members
or parole officers are "relatively novel, complex and of great local
importance." 2 With the recent abrogation of tort immunity in Vir-
ginia,3 the courts have been left with the arduous task of determin-
ing the boundaries of official immunity. Thus far, however, the
state courts have failed to adequately address the immunity issue
as it pertains to parole officials who negligently release or supervise
a parolee.4 This Note will discuss the theories that have tradition-
1. See generally Note, Parole Board Liability for the Criminal Acts of Parolee: Reiser v.
District of Columbia, 8 CAP. U.L. REV. 149 (1978); Note, Holding Governments Strictly Lia-
ble for the Release of Dangerous Parolees, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 907 (1980) [hereinafter Note,
Holding Governments Strictly Liable]; Note, Civil Liability of Parole Officials for Releas-
ing Dangerous Prisoners: Martinez v. California, 16 TULSA L.J. 229 (1980) [hereinafter Note,
Civil Liability]; Note, Torts-Governmental Immunity-Absolute Versus Qualified Immu-
nity for Public Officials Acting in Quasi-Judicial Capacities, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1513 (1978).
2. Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 90 (4th Cir. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 850942 (Va. Aug.
15, 1986). In this article the terms "parole board" and "parole officials" are used
interchangeably.
3. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-195.1 to -.8 (Cum. Supp. 1986). See generally Taylor, A Re-
examination of Sovereign Tort Immunity in Virginia, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 247 (1981); Note;
The Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity in Virginia: The Virginia Tort Claims Act, 7
G.M.U. L. REV. 291 (1984).
4. Currently pending in the Virginia Supreme Court is the case of Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d
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ally shielded parole officials from tort liability in other jurisdic-
tions,5 and will predict their likelihood of success in Virginia.'
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN VIRGINIA
"[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is 'alive and well' in Vir-
ginia, 17 and it is deeply rooted in the state's common law.8 Based
upon the principle that "the King can do no wrong," this doctrine
provides that the Commonwealth of Virginia cannot be sued unless
expressly allowed by statute. 0 Historically, this theory dates back
nearly 600 years and was followed by American law because of the
notion that "there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends."" More recently,
the arguments in support of sovereign immunity are based on the
practical concerns of protecting public funds, 2 protecting official
decision-making,' 3 and preventing the fear which otherwise would
accompany public service.' 4
There is currently a national trend toward abolishing the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity on the general precept that liability
84 (4th Cir. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 850942 (Va. Aug. 15, 1986), in which the court must
address whether a parole official is liable for failing to reincarcerate a parolee who had vio-
lated parole conditions and who subsequently harmed an individual.
5. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons
and Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478 (M.D. Ala.), afl'd, 548 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1976); Thompson v.
County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980); Wasserstein v.
State, 27 N.Y.2d 627, 261 N.E.2d 665, 313 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1970).
6. This article deals only with causes of action for negligent release and supervision of a
parolee. It does not focus on those causes of action dealing with a parole official's failure to
disclose the parolee's violent background or the failure to notify specific individuals of a
parolee's release.
7. Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 307, 321 S.E.2d 657, 666 (1984).
8. See Eriksen v. Anderson, 195 Va. 655, 79 S.E.2d 597 (1954); Hicks v. Anderson, 182 Va.
195, 28 S.E.2d 629 (1944); see also Note, supra note 3, at 291 n.6 and accompanying text
(state immunity from suit in tort is part of the common law of Virginia.
9. See Note, Sovereign Immunity for State Hospital Employees After James v. Jane, 67
VA. L. REV. 393, 394 n.4 and accompanying text (1981).
10. Taylor v. Williams, 78 Va. 422 (1884); see also Note, supra note 3, at 292 n.8 and
accompanying text,
11. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); see also Taylor, supra note 3, at
249-50; Note, supra note 9, at 397.
12. Hinchey v. Ogden, 226 Va. 234, 307 S.E.2d 891 (1983); see also Taylor, supra note 3,
at 253-55 (listing six arguments in support of governmental immunity); Note, Municipal
Tort Immunity in Virginia, 68 VA. L. REV. 639, 645-47 (1982) (the greatest obstacle to im-
posing liability on municipalities is fear that liability will bankrupt them).
13. Messina, 228 Va. at 307, 321 S.E.2d at 666; Board of Public Works v. Gannt, 76 Va.
455, 462 (1882); see also Taylor, supra note 3, at 253; Note, supra note 12, at 644.
14. Messina, 228 Va. at 307, 321 S.E.2d at 253.
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should follow negligence.'6 The majority view in America today is
that it is an abdication of government responsibility to fail to com-
pensate tort victims injured by the negligence of government em-
ployees and these damages should be paid just as the government
pays other operating expenses.16
The Virginia General Assembly's response to the national trend
was to enact, in 1981, the Virginia Tort Claims Act (the "Act").17
In an attempt to abrogate or limit sovereign immunity, the Act
provides that public officers and their agents and employees are
not immune from tort suits unless the defendant can prove his ac-
tivity falls within an exception to the general rule. Pursuant to sec-
tion 8.01-195.3 of the Code of Virginia, the Commonwealth shall be
liable for damages "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or om-
mission of any employee while acting within the scope of his em-
ployment. . . if a private person would be liable to the claimant
for such damage, loss, injury or death."' 8 At first glance it seems as
if the Act generously waives the defense of sovereign immunity.
However, the Act preserves the "immunity of judges, the Attorney
General, Commonwealth's attorneys, and other public officers,
their agents and employees . . . [to the] degree that such persons
presently are immunized."' This clause is significant because it
does not negate those previous Virginia Supreme Court decisions
which permit suit against various state employees. 20 Furthermore,
the Act specifically lists six instances where the waiver of sovereign
immunity does not apply.2' Therefore, although the Act purports
15. Taylor, supra note 3, at 261-64.
16. Id. at 255 (citing Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, -, 296
N.E.2d 461, 465 (1973)). "Negligence is negligence" and a person committing such should
consequently be liable. James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 55, 267 S.E.2d 108, 115 (1980) (Cochran,
J., concurring).
17. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-195.1 to .8 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
18. Id. § 8.01-195.3.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., James, 221 Va. 43, 267 S.E.2d 108 (physicians employed at state hospital are
not protected by sovereign immunity in actions for negligence brought by their patients);
Short v. Griffitts, 220 Va. 53, 255 S.E.2d 479 (1979) (athletic director and coach/supervisor
of public high school are not protected by governmental immunity in an action for negli-
gence); Crabbe v. School Bd., 209 Va. 356, 164 S.E.2d 639 (1968) (governmental immunity of
school board does not extend to teacher); Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 155 S.E.2d 369
(1967) (state police officer not immune from liability where he spoke defamatory words
while performing duties).
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (Cum. Supp. 1986) lists the following six exceptions to the
rule:
1. Any claim against the Commonwealth based upon an act or omission which oc-
curred prior to July 1, 1982.
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to abolish sovereign immunity, the numerous exclusions to the rule
appear to circumvent its effect on tort liability.
III. THEORIES PREVENTING PAROLE BOARD LIABILITY WHERE A
RELEASED PAROLEE COMMITS A CRIMINAL ACT
A. Quasi-Judicial Immunity
The first obstacle a tort victim in Virginia must overcome in or-
der to recover for the negligence of a public employee is quasi-judi-
cial immunity. Quasi-judicial immunity is an extension of the long-
recognized doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.
Under the principle of judicial immunity, judges, in the exercise
of their official decision-making duties, are immune from suit even
if such acts are done maliciously.22 The purpose of such immunity
is the compelling public policy to preserve the independence of the
judiciary and to protect judges from undue influence and
intimidation.23
In recent years, this immunity has been extended to shield other
public officials whose duties include acts similar to those per-
formed in the judicial process. 24 In determining whether defend-
ants can take advantage of quasi-judicial immunity, it must be es-
tablished that "the defendants were (1) performing judicial
la. Any claim against a transportation district based upon an act or omission which
occurred prior to July 1, 1986.
2. Any claim based upon an act or omission of the General Assembly or district com-
mission of any transportation district, or any member or staff thereof acting in his
official capacity, or to the legislative function of any agency subject to the provisions
of this article.
3. Any claim based upon an act or omission of any court of the Commonwealth, or
any member thereof acting in his official capacity, or to the judicial functions of any
agency subject to the provisions of this article.
4. Any claim based upon an act or omission of an officer, agent or employee of any
agency of government in the execution of a lawful order of any court.
5. Any claim arising in connection with the assessment or collection of taxes.
6. Any claim arising out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or adminis-
trative proceeding, even if without probable cause.
22. Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131, 143 (1885); see also Bellamy v. Gates, 214 Va. 314,
200 S.E.2d 533 (1973); Berry v. Smith, 148 Va. 424, 139 S.E. 252 (1927).
23. Mullins v. Oakley, 437 F.2d 1217, 1218 (4th Cir. 1971).
24. See Harlow v. Clatterbuck, 230 Va. 490, 339 S.E.2d 181 (1986) (immunity of a rehabil-
itative counselor, a juvenile learning center supervisor and a juvenile after care supervisor).
Earlier cases also extended immunity to public officials whose duties were similar to judicial
functions. See, e.g., Yates v. Ley, 121 Va. 265, 92 S.E. 837 (1917) (notary public acting in
good faith qualifies for immunity); Johnston, 80 Va. 131 (Mayor of Danville qualifies for
immunity in suit for false imprisonment).
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functions, (2) acting within their jurisdiction, and (3) acting in
good faith."2
A number of jurisdictions apply quasi-judicial immunity to pa-
role officials when they are making parole decisions.26 The basic
premise underlying these cases is that the decision to grant parole
can be equated to that of a judge determining a sentence. As the
court stated in Pate v. Alabama:27
The function of the Parole Board is more nearly akin to that of a
judge in imposing sentence and granting or denying probation than
it is to that of an executive administrator. It is essential to the
proper administration of criminal justice that those who determine
whether an individual shall remain incarcerated or be set free
should do so without concern over possible personal liability at law
for such criminal acts as some parolee will inevitably commit.28
While the Virginia Supreme Court has never specifically ad-
dressed parole official liability, dicta can be found in the recent
case of Harlow v. Clatterbuck29 lending strong support for the pre-
mise that parole board members and parole officers in Virginia
would be protected by quasi-judicial immunity. In Harlow, a juve-
nile was committed by the Virginia Department of Corrections
(Department) to a juvenile learning institution for assaulting a po-
lice officer. Approximately seven months later, a discharge order
was issued for the juvenile on the advice of the defendants, a reha-
bilitative counselor, a learning center supervisor and an after care
supervisor respectively. Twelve weeks after the discharge, the juve-
nile and four accomplices robbed and assaulted the plaintiff. Plain-
tiff brought a tort action against the employees of the Department
claiming that "defendants knew or should have known that [the
juvenile] presented a danger to members of the public. Accord-
ingly, [they] were grossly negligent in discharging [the juvenile]
25. Harlow, 230 Va. at 494, 339 S.E.2d at 185.
26. Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 548
F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1976); Silver v. Dickson, 403 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1968) (in reviewing appli-
cations for parole, parole board members were performing quasi-judicial functions and
therefore granted immunity), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 990 (1969); Lang v. Wood, 92 F.2d 211
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 686 (1937) (immunity for federal parole board members
upon the allegations of arbitrarily revoking plaintiff's parole).
27. 409 F. Supp. 478.
28. Id. at 479.
29. 230 Va. 490, 339 S.E.2d 181.
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without after care supervision and that this negligence proximately
caused her injuries. '30
The court held that the defendants were shielded from civil lia-
bility on the grounds of quasi-judicial immunity. The court stated:
It is in the interest of the public and of the committed child that the
defendants, and other public officials who perform similar functions,
be immune from suits for damages .... If they were not shielded
with quasi-judicial immunity, it is probable that their judgments
would be always against a child's release. 1
While Harlow deals only with Department juvenile officers, the
language "and other public officials who perform similar func-
tions''32 evinces intent by the court to apply the holding by analogy
to parole officials supervising adult criminals as well. This intent is
also demonstrated by the court's conclusion that the defendants'
judgments were similar to those made by parole board members
who have been clothed with immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil
rights actions based on their parole decisions.2
Arguably, however, a plaintiff could contend that there are im-
portant distinctions between judicial decision-makers and parole
board members. Judges and parole officials are dissimilar in that a
judge's decision can be questioned by appellate review; no such
safeguards check a parole board's decision.34 Also, whereas a judge
owes a duty to the public in general, a parole official narrows his
duty to individual members of the public by assuming parole su-
pervision over a dangerous person.3 5 Finally, a judge's opinion re-
ceives special deference whereas a parole board's decision receives
30. Id. at 493, 339 S.E.2d at 183. Alternatively, the plaintiff also claimed that the defend-
ants failed to perform certain ministerial duties imposed on them by Department regula-
tions and the Code of Virginia. Id.
31. Id. at 495, 339 S.E.2d at 185.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 494, 339 S.E.2d at 184-85 (citing Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981)); Douglas v. Muncey, 570 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1978); Pope
v. Chew, 521 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1975); Cruz v. Skelton, 502 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1974); Silver,
403 F.2d 642; Seiss v. McConnell, 74 Mich. App. 613, 255 N.W.2d 2 (1977); Jarrett v. Wills,
235 Or. 51, 383 P.2d 995 (1963); Estate of Armstrong v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation, 46
Pa. Commw. 33, 405 A.2d 1099 (1979); Reiff v. Commonwealth, 23 Pa. Commw. 537, 354
A.2d 918 (1976).
34. Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, -, 564 P.2d 1227, 1233
(1977). Also, past decisions to equate the acts of judges with the acts of administrators are
based on questionable reasoning. Note, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at 236.
35. Grimm, 115 Ariz. at -, 564 P.2d at 1234.
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less deference. Thus the "trust placed in the judgment of a judge is
not the same as that of an administrative officer."'3 6 Therefore, as a
consequence of these differences, it has been held that there is no
logical reason to afford quasi-judicial immunity to parole board
members.37
B. Qualified Immunity
Assuming that a parole official in Virginia is not shielded by
quasi-judicial immunity, a plaintiff still faces the obstacle of quali-
fied immunity when alleging negligent release or supervision of a
parolee. Traditionally, senior government officials such as the gov-
ernor, judges, and members of the legislature have been insulated
by absolute immunity.38 This immunity has progressively ex-
panded to include other governmental employees as well. 9 How-
ever, determining which government employees are entitled to this
qualified immunity requires "line-drawing"40 and it has bee n rec-
ognized that the doctrine is confusing and extremely difficult to
predict.41 Consequently, the Virginia Supreme Court has at-
tempted to clarify the doctrine of qualified immunity in a number
of recent decisions.
These decisions culminated in James v. Jane,42 which enunci-
ated guidelines for determining liability. In James, the defendants
were fully licensed physicians at the University of Virginia Hospi-
tal, an agency of the Commonwealth of Virginia. They received
compensation solely from the University of Virginia rather than
from their respective patients. The plaintiffs brought suit for negli-
gent care. The defendants contended that they were performing
discretionary duties within the scope of their employment and
were consequently entitled to qualified immunity.
In holding for the plaintiffs, the court articulated several factors
to be considered in determining whether a public employee is af-
36. Id. at -, 564 P.2d at 1231.
37. See id. at 1233. The court held that the defendant parole board members did not
have absolute immunity for a suit brought because a parolee injured the plaintiff.
38. Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 309, 321 S.E.2d 657, 661 (1984) (citing W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 987-88 (4th ed. 1971)).
39. Messina, 228 Va. at 309, 321 S.E.2d at 661.
40. Id. at 309, 321 S.E.2d at.662.
41. See Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 89 (4th Cir. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 850942 (Va.
Aug. 15, 1986); see also Groves v. Cox, 559 F. Supp. 772, 774 n.8 (E.D. Va. 1983).
42. 221 Va. 43, 267 S.E.2d 108 (1980).
19871
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forded qualified immunity. These factors are as follows: (1) the na-
ture of the function performed by the employee; (2) the extent of
the state's interest and involvement in the function; (3) the degree
of control and direction exercised by the state over the employee;
and (4) whether the act complained of involved the use of judg-
ment and discretion.43
In light of these factors, the court recognized that while the
Commonwealth does have an interest in a patient's care, this inter-
est is no stronger for patients in a state hospital than those in a
private hospital. Furthermore, the governmental control over and
involvement in a particular patient's care was minimal. This is be-
cause implicit in the defendant's employment was the understand-
ing that patient contact "becomes . . . personal and confidential
[between] doctor and patient, not the Commonwealth of Virginia
and patient."44 Therefore, the doctors were deemed to be responsi-
ble for their own negligent acts and thus did not enjoy qualified
immunity.45
Interestingly, the court explicitly limited the holding in this case
to the specific situation of a physician employed by the state of
Virginia. 4e Therefore, it is implied that a case-by-case examination
is required to determine liability. Fortunately, the opinion provides
significant insight into the probable outcome of cases involving
negligent release or supervision causes of action against parole
officials.
With regard to the act of releasing a prisoner, there is a strong
argument that qualified immunity would apply. Under the James
analysis, the court held for the plaintiff predominately because of
the lack of a strong state interest. Here, however, the state has a
strong interest in the public's safety and, presumably, parole
boards consider the consequences of release to prevent jeopardiz-
ing that safety, Unlike James, where the state's interest was not
greater merely because a state hospital was involved, the opposite
applies with the release of a parolee. As custodian of an individual
in prison, the state obviously has a strong interest in isolating the
criminal from society. This interest does not subside simply be-
cause the prisoner is released on parole. Parole is "not a release of
43. Messina, 228 Va. at 313, 321 S.E.2d at 663 (citing James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 53, 267
S.E.2d 108, 113 (1980)).
44. James, 221 Va. at 50, 267 S.E.2d at 112.
45. For a general discussion, see Note, supra note 9.
46. James, 221 Va. at 55, 267 S.E.2d at 114.
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the prisoner from all disciplinary restraint, but [merely] an exten-
sion of the prison walls . . .
Secondly, in addition to the imperative state interest involved,
the parole board exercises complete discretion in determining
whether to grant a release. 48 Admittedly, the amount of discretion
involved is not always determinative of immunity.49 However, the
state's interest combined with the wide discretionary powers ac-
corded the parole board would likely result in qualified
immunity.5 0
A cause of action for the negligent supervision of a parolee might
give the plaintiff a better chance of relief under Virginia law. While
there are some jurisdictions that equate the decision to release a
prisoner with decisions made in the course of supervision, there
seems to be a trend towards treating parole supervision as a minis-
terial act unprotected by qualified immunity.5 Illustrative of this
trend is the Fourth Circuit case of Semler v. Psychiatric Insti-
tute.5 2 In Semler, the plaintiff brought an action against a psychi-
atric hospital and a psychiatrist to recover for the death of her
daughter who was killed by an out-patient probationer. Defend-
ants filed a third-party complaint against the probation officer for
indemnification. The probationer, Gilreath, was originally on
judge-ordered day-care status, meaning he was under the supervi-
sion of the institute all day and under the supervision of his par-
ents at night. The probation officer had the discretion to grant
weekend passes as he deemed appropriate. The doctor at the insti-
tute removed Gilreath from this day-care status and enrolled him
in a semi-weekly therapy group. The probation officer knew of this
arrangement but failed to notify the judge to gain approval. Subse-
47. Alvarado v. McLaughlin, 486 F.2d 541, 544 (4th Cir. 1973) (quoting United States v.
Nicholson, 78 F.2d 468, 469-70 (4th Cir. 1935)), vacated sub nom. McLaughlin v. Prieto, 418
U.S. 903 (1974).
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-313 (Repl. Vol. 1983) states: "The Virginia Parole Board shall
have discretion to release such person upon a determination that he or she has demon-
strated that such release is compatible with the interests of society and of such person and
his or her successful rehabilitation to that extent."
49. James, 221 Va. at 53, 267 S.E.2d at 113.
50. Cf. Lawhorne v. Harlan, 214 Va. 405, 200 S.E.2d 569 (1973) (there was both a strong
state interest and a demand that the defendants exercise wide discretionary power).
Lawhorne was overruled in First Virginia Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 301 S.E.2d 8
(1983).
51. See, e.g., Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Semler v. Psy-
chiatric Institute, 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Folliard v. Semler, 429 U.S.
827 (1976).
52. 538 F.2d 121.
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quently, Gilreath killed the plaintiff's daughter.
The court rejected the defendant probation officer's argument
that his supervision of Gilreath was a discretionary act protected
by qualified immunity. The court noted that "[u]nder Virginia law,
a state employee who exercises discretionary judgment within the
scope of his employment is immune from liability for negligence.
Conversely, he is liable if injury results from the negligent per-
formance of a ministerial act."'53 The probation officer's responsi-
bility to obtain approval from the judge before changing the pa-
rolee's status was a ministerial act and consequently not entitled to
immunity.5 4 What is significant about this case is the court's dis-
tinction between the discretionary act of release and the ministe-
rial act of supervision. The court stated that "[a] probation of-
ficer's basic policy decisions are discretionary and hence immune,
but his acts implementing the policy must be considered on a case-
by-case basis to determine whether they are ministerial. ' 55 In light
of this distinction, the arguments supporting qualified immunity
for a parole officer alleged to have negligently supervised a parolee
are beginning to weaken in Virginia.
C. Duty of Care
Simply because a parole official is not insulated from liability by
quasi-judicial or qualified immunity does not necessarily guarantee
that the plaintiff will recover. The -plaintiff has the additional bur-
den of proving that the parole official owed an actionable duty of
care to the victim and that the parole official's alleged negligence
proximately caused the victim's injuries.56
In Virginia, whether a parole officer owes a duty to the victim is
a question of law.57 This determination often hinges primarily on
53. Id. at 127 (citing Lawhorne, 214 Va. 405, 200 S.E.2d 569).
54. A ministerial act is "one which a person performs in a given state of facts and pre-
scribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority without regard to, or the
exercise of, his own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done." Dovel v. Bertram,
184 Va. 19, 22, 34 S.E.2d 369, 370 (1945) (quoting Flournoy v. City of Jeffersonville, 17 Ind.
169, 79 Am. Dec. 468 (1861)).
55. Semler, 538 F.2d at 127 (citing Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, -, 447 P.2d 352,
362, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 250 (1968)).
56. In Trimyer v. Norfolk Tallow Co., 192 Va. 776, 780, 66 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1951), the
court stated: "To constitute actionable negligence there must be a duty, a violation thereof,
and a consequent injury. An accident which is not reasonably to be foreseen by the exercise
of reasonable care and prudence is no sufficient ground for a negligence action."
57. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Bullock, 182 Va. 440, 445, 29 S.E.2d 228, 230
[Vol. 22:83
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the degree of foreseeability that a particular individual would be
endangered by the release of a prisoner.58 For instance, in Thomp-
son v. County of Alameda,59 an incarcerated juvenile indicated
that he would harm a child residing in his neighborhood upon re-
lease. Subsequent to his release, the juvenile did, in fact, sexually
assault and murder a five-year-old boy. The court held that the
murdered child was not within the class of foreseeable victims and
consequently the parole officer was not liable. The court reasoned
that unless the potential victim could be identified with specificity,
policy reasons demanded that parole boards have no duty to warn
nonspecific victims.60  These policy considerations included
preventing the increased costs of parole operations and overly cau-
tious parole decisions. There was also fear that a duty to warn the
public generally would hamper rehabilitation efforts. 1
Similarly, an exception has developed to the rule that a duty of
care is owed only to the general public "where a special relation-
ship has been established between the governmental unit and the
plaintiff. 6 2 In Semler,63 the court noted that a special relationship
was created by the state court's probation order, which provided a
dual purpose for the type of probation that the criminal was to
receive. The order specified that the structured treatment at a psy-
chiatric institute was designed to help the probationer as well as
protect young girls from a foreseeable risk of attack. This type of
court order imposed a duty on the parole officer to protect the
public. 4 Because the court in Semler focused on the significance of
the judge's order imposing a duty to protect, one could argue that
without such an explicit order a parole official in Virginia would
not owe a duty to any particular individual.6 5
(1944).
58. Semler v. Psychiatric Institute, 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976) (quoting Trimyer, 192
Va. at 780, 66 S.E.2d at 443), cert. denied sub nom. Folliard v. Semler, 429 U.S. 827 (1976));
see also Reiser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Thompson v. County
of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741, -, 614 P.2d 728, 732-33, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 74-75 (1980); Note,
Holding Governments Strictly Liable, supra note 1, at 907, 915-20.
59. 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70.
60. Id. at 754, 614 P.2d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
61. Id. at 756, 614 P.2d at 737, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
62. Reiser, 563 F.2d at 478.
63. 538 F.2d 121.
64. Id. at 126.
65. See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (The victim's injuries, which were
a consequence of a prisoner being released on parole, were too remote to hold the parole
officer liable.).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Increasingly, critics are voicing concern over the failure of parole
rehabilitation and the suggestion that parole does nothing more
than prematurely release dangerous convicts from prison.6 In re-
sponse, some jurisdictions have limited the immunity once af-
forded parole officials. 7 However, the status of Virginia law con-
cerning parole officials "remains exceedingly difficult and
unclear."68 Notwithstanding, state decisions such as Harlow v.
Clatterbuck69 and James v. Jane7" seem to indicate that the
chances of a plaintiff recovering for a parole official's negligence
are slim. The barriers of qualified immunity and, in particular,
quasi-judicial immunity appear to be well on their way to becom-
ing insurmountable obstacles to recovery in Virginia.
Diane Miller Lowder
66. Note, Holding Governments Strictly Liable, supra note 1, at 907 n.104 and accompa-
nying text; Note, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at 238 n.66-67.
67. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
68. Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 89 (4th Cir. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 850942 (Va. Aug.
15, 1986).
69. 230 Va. 490, 339 S.E.2d 181 (1986).
70. 221 Va. 43, 267 S.E.2d 108 (1980).
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